

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**US ARMY CULTURAL OBSTACLES TO TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP**

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## **ABSTRACT**

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“The premium on tomorrow’s battlefield will be the ability to quickly analyze a situation and come up with innovative solutions. The speed at which events occur and their complexity will require leaders with agile minds who can think through a problem logically, [determine] a viable course of action, and translate that concept into clear, simple language to his subordinates.” Although these words sound like a direct lift of the current 2007 Army Posture statement, which discusses the “pentathlete” leader, they were written by the 33rd CSA – GEN Dennis Reimer. Therefore, although these leader attributes have been discussed for over eight years, there appears to be little substantive change to the Army’s Leader Development Program. This essay explores how cultural/organizational elements impede the Army’s efforts in developing agile, innovative, flexible, imaginative, and creative transformational leaders.

The first section (background) discusses transformational leadership and establishes the interdependence of culture and leadership development. The second section examines how four cultural elements hamper development of transformational leaders: leadership composition, the “by the book,” “by the numbers” process driven culture, the linear progression system, and the current officer evaluation system. The paper concludes with recommended changes to minimize the impact of these cultural obstacles.



## US ARMY CULTURAL OBSTACLES TO TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP

“The premium on tomorrow’s battlefield will be the ability to quickly analyze a situation and come up with innovative solutions. The speed at which events occur and their complexity will require leaders with agile minds who can think through a problem logically, come up with a viable course of action, and translate that concept into clear, simple language to subordinates. Further the varied circumstances in which leaders may find themselves when conducting both battlefield operations and [irregular warfare]...will require intellectual flexibility and the ability to think creatively on one’s feet.”<sup>1</sup> Although these words may sound like a direct lift of the current 2007 Army Posture statement which discusses the necessity for the agile and adaptive “pentathlete” leader, these words were written by the 33rd CSA – GEN Dennis Reimer in 1999.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, although the agile and adaptive leader attributes have been actively discussed for the past eight years, there appears to be no “walk behind the talk” – no substantive changes in the Army’s Leader Development Program. How can it be that an Army Chief of Staff called for agile and adaptive leaders over eight years ago, and yet very little progress been made in leader development programs? Did his wisdom fall on deaf ears? Numerous experts (Bass, Jacobs, Pasmore, Yukl) in the field of organizational culture have consistently concluded that “no leader development system can succeed unless all the elements of the system are focused on the same set of objectives and that set of objectives is consistent with operating values and the organizations culture.”<sup>3</sup> Therefore, it appears that although the Army acknowledged the requirement to change its Leader Development Program, efforts to fully implement the necessary changes are significantly hampered by organizational cultural obstacles that act as barriers to change. This essay will explore how elements of the current culture and organization impede the Army’s efforts in developing a bench of agile, innovative, flexible, imaginative, and creative transformational leaders.

COL Powell Hutton stated, “The Army learns very slowly, because you have to change the culture; the culture changes slowly because innovators are forced out. If we’re going to do one thing to make the organization healthy, we have to promote people who aren’t like us.”<sup>4</sup> Recently, a senior Four-Star General validated the urgency of this requirement in citing a “collective failure of imagination” as one of his top concerns as the Army transforms to meet the challenges of the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) 21<sup>st</sup> Century Security Environment.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, the Army’s challenge is to “foster a military culture where those promoted to the highest ranks possess the imagination and intellectual framework to support innovation.”<sup>6</sup> In other words, the Army’s culture must transform to facilitate the development of

transformational leaders. The first section of this essay serves as background by providing the attributes of the transformational leader, discussing why the Army needs these leaders, and the interdependence of culture and leadership. The second section examines how four cultural elements hamper the Army's efforts in developing transformational leaders: leadership composition, the "by the book," "by the numbers" operational culture, the "cookie cutter" linear progression/assignment system, and the short term performance based officer evaluation system. Finally, the paper's last section concludes with recommended initial change steps necessary to minimize the impact of these cultural obstacles.

## Section I - Background

### What is a Transformational Leader?

Leadership, according to the Army's capstone leadership doctrine FM 22-100, is "influencing people-by providing purpose, direction, and motivation- while operating to accomplish the mission and improve the organization."<sup>7</sup> The critical action verb within the definition - "influence" (the ability of one person to affect the course of events or another persons thinking or action) condenses the concept of leadership into inputs and outcomes of the human relationship exchange between leaders and led.<sup>8</sup> Prior to 1978, most theories focused on the exploitation of authoritative relationships in examining leadership techniques. Contingent reinforcement, a concept that uses the "carrot and stick" approach to influence subordinates to perform desired actions, was thought to be the foundation of leadership.<sup>9</sup> The use of contingent reinforcement in the leader-led relationship became known as "transactional leadership." In 1978 the term "transformational leadership" was introduced.<sup>10</sup> Transformational leadership expands upon transactional leadership by probing deeper into the human dimension of interaction to address "the follower's sense of self-worth in order to engage the follower in true commitment and involvement in the effort at hand."<sup>11</sup> Whereas transactional leadership techniques focus on the superficial "if-then" exchange between leader and led, transformational leadership focuses on the underlying commitment of the leader and led to shared goals and ideals as its basis for influencing behavior. "Factor studies from Bass (1985) to Howell and Avolio (1993), Bycio, Hackett, and Allen (1995) to Avolio, Bass, and Jung (1997) identified the components of transformational leadership – Charismatic Leadership, Inspirational Motivation, Intellectual Stimulation and Individualized Consideration."<sup>12</sup>

Charismatic Leadership. Transformational leaders behave in ways that result in their being role models for their followers. The leaders are admired, respected, and trusted. Followers identify with the leaders and want to emulate them; leaders are endowed by their followers as having extraordinary capabilities,

persistence, and determination. The leaders are willing to take risks and are consistent rather than arbitrary. They can be counted on to do the right thing, demonstrating high standards of ethical and moral conduct.<sup>13</sup>

**Inspirational Motivation.** Transformational leaders behave in ways that motivate and inspire those around them by providing meaning and challenge to their followers' work. Team spirit is aroused. Enthusiasm and optimism are displayed. Leaders get followers involved in envisioning attractive future states; they create clearly communicated expectations that followers want to meet and also demonstrate commitment to goals and the shared vision. Charismatic leadership and inspirational motivation usually form a combined single factor of charismatic-inspirational leadership.<sup>14</sup>

**Intellectual Stimulation.** Transformational leaders stimulate their followers' efforts to be innovative and creative by questioning assumptions, reframing problems, and approaching old situations in new ways. Creativity is encouraged. There is no public criticism of individual members' mistakes. New ideas and creative problem solutions are solicited from followers, who are included in the process of addressing problems and finding solutions. Followers are encouraged to try new approaches, and their ideas are not criticized because they differ from the leaders' ideas.<sup>15</sup>

**Individualized Consideration.** Transformational leaders pay special attention to each individual follower's needs for achievement and growth by acting as coach or mentor. Followers and colleagues are developed to successively higher levels of potential. Individualized consideration is practiced when new learning opportunities are created along with a supportive climate. Individual differences in terms of needs and desires are recognized. The leader's behavior demonstrates acceptance of individual differences (e.g.; some employees receive more encouragement, some more autonomy, others firmer standards, and still others more task structure). A two-way exchange in communication is encouraged, and "management by walking around" work spaces is practiced. Interactions with followers are personalized (e.g.; the leader remembers previous conversations, is aware of individual concerns, and sees the individual as a whole person rather than as just an employee). The individually considerate leader listens effectively. The leader delegates tasks as a means of developing followers. Delegated tasks are monitored to see if the followers need additional direction or support and to assess progress; ideally, followers do not feel they are being check on.<sup>16</sup>

These transformational leadership characteristics/behaviors "personalize" leadership by introducing the complexity of human relationships into leadership theory and practice. In the profession of arms, wherein success is founded on the result of human interaction and dynamics, and "war is fundamentally a human endeavor," this added dimension of leadership is imperative.<sup>17</sup>

## Why does the US Army Need Transformational Leaders?

Albert Einstein once postulated, “The significant problems we face today cannot be solved at the same level of thinking we were at when we created them.”<sup>18</sup> In interpreting Einstein, the leadership challenges we face today in transforming our Army cannot be solved using the same Cold War baby boomer generation leadership mentalities that created them. Just as weapons systems have continuously evolved to deal with external threats and to leverage the technical sophistication and intelligence of the people that operate them, leadership style and techniques must also evolve to address the external and internal organizational environments that comprise today’s Army: Externally to meet the challenges of leading Soldiers in the VUCA security environment, and internally to adapt to the composition of the Army itself – the attitudes and dispositions of its members.

The need to develop transformational leaders that “set challenging expectations, motivate others to do more than they originally intended, and often even more than they thought possible” at all levels is an external operational imperative in today’s decentralized VUCA environment.<sup>19</sup> As uncertainty and complexity increases in an environment, followers must be inspired by the leader to see beyond their own immediate needs (personal consequences or rewards of their individual action) to a commitment of how their actions impact others.<sup>20</sup> The Army recognizes this requirement as its newest recruiting campaign – *Army Strong* is founded upon it. The campaign premise “Strong is standing up for yourself, Army Strong is standing up for everyone else around you,” not only issues a challenge to potential recruits, it also establishes the requirement for transformational leaders that can inspire this deep level of commitment.<sup>21</sup> Studies of transactional versus transformational leadership component effectiveness in both stable and unstable environments indicate that transactional leadership can be as effective as transformational leadership in stable, repetitive, and predictable environments. However, in an uncertain unstable environment where complexity, volatility, and ambiguity are increased, transformational leadership rated approximately 85% more effective than transactional leadership.<sup>22</sup> Therefore, in addressing today’s external operating environment, described in the 2007 Army Posture Statement as “an era of uncertainty and unpredictability” movement from superficial transactional leadership to the deeper human dimension of transformational leadership is an imperative for the Army in addressing the needs of the external environment.<sup>23</sup> GEN Schoomaker summed up this imperative best when he stated, “While technology has helped the Army become more lethal and effective, individual soldiers still do the fighting...Warfare fundamentally is a human endeavor. It’s a test of will. It’s a test of things deep within us.”<sup>24</sup>



In addition to meeting the external requirement of human behavioral effectiveness in warfare, transformational leaders that inspire “deep will” are necessary to meet vital internal requirements. Transformational leaders are necessary to retain quality leaders in the All Volunteer Force. The Army’s Junior Officers (JOs) (Lieutenants and Captains) and Soldiers entering the Army today are members of Generation Y. Generation Y is defined as those born between 1977 and 1994 therefore, lieutenants, captains, mid level non-commissioned officers, and most subordinate members are part of this generation.<sup>25</sup> These leaders and Soldiers, a generation raised by involved and over indulgent parents in a multi-media highly technical environment, are “willing to learn, technologically savvy and motivated.”<sup>26</sup> As a group they exhibit the following attributes and characteristics:

- Adaptable: Generation Y is used to adapting and being comfortable in various situations. They are highly confident in their abilities.
- Technologically savvy: Generation Y is very comfortable with the use of technology and how to leverage it.
- Ability to grasp new concepts: Generation Y is a learning-oriented generation.
- Efficient multi-taskers: Generation Y can multi-task faster and better than their competition.
- Tolerant: Generation Y will make the increasingly diverse workforce feel at home and comfortable.
- Career minded. Generation Y’ers want to take a job because they want to work there, not because they have to. Making a difference in the world, or the company, is what these new workers are looking for.
- Family Oriented. Generation Y recognizes the importance of having a strong family relationship and will make family a priority over work interests.<sup>27</sup>

Given these attributes, Jordan Kaplan, a managerial science professor at Long Island University, characterized Generation Y’s attitude in the workplace as: Generation Y is “less likely to respond to the traditional command-and-control type of management, they’ve grown up questioning their parents, and now they’re questioning their employers. They don’t know how to shut up, which is great, but that’s aggravating to the 50-year-old manager who says, ‘Do it and do it now.’<sup>28</sup> Therefore, exercising solely transactional leadership based on the contingent reinforcement method of - do it and do it now, and you’ll get x, on our newest generation of junior leaders, will potentially result in low professional job satisfaction and higher attrition of junior officers upon completion of their initial service obligation. Evidence of this potential is perhaps already being seen within the Army. The attrition rate of the first class of USMA

Generation Y officers, year group 2000, approximately 32.5%, is the highest rate in 16 years.<sup>29</sup> Some may argue that the operational tempo and numbers of deployments caused by Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom is the obvious root cause for this increase. However, a Congressional research study published in 2006 indicates that the attrition rate for officers upon completion of their mandatory service obligation actually decreased from a historic 8.5% annual rate to 7.8% during this same timeframe, and that the attrition for the same cohort year group of ROTC commissioned officers, did not increase.<sup>30</sup> Therefore, it is possible to surmise that the contingent reinforcement, highly structured methods of transactional leadership used to develop USMA officers through four years of college, and then perhaps continued during their first duty assignment – nine years total, could be a contributing factor in this emerging retention problem.

As outlined above, Generation Y is career minded and ambitious. Their intelligence and confidence, coupled with a genuine belief that they can do anything, makes them extremely motivated to do well, however, they must feel they are a valued contributing member of their team. They have a strong appetite for self-satisfaction, and are not, as a group, willing to be “spoon fed.” They therefore require a leadership environment that not only empowers them, but more importantly challenges and stimulates them intellectually. The Army’s current JOs have found this environment on the battlefields of Iraq in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The complexity of the OIF mission creates a highly decentralized environment in which small units are operating in a semi-autonomous nature throughout the operational area. Therefore, junior officers are responsible for leading and executing small-unit operations within a general command intent with minimal how to guidance. In this empowered and intellectually stimulating and challenging environment, they are demonstrating their intelligence, confidence, motivation, adaptability, and flexibility in accomplishing a myriad of complex and diverse mission sets.<sup>31</sup> This complex environment is providing not only a “crucible” leadership development experience, it is providing them the value added self-satisfaction needed to deepen their commitment to the Army as a career.<sup>32</sup> The challenge facing the Army is to keep this commitment from waning by replicating this transformational leadership environment throughout all echelons of the organization, specifically in the garrison/non-deployed Army and for officers serving in staff positions. Dr Leonard Wong accurately states the key question: “What happens when these junior officers-who have experienced the exhilaration of leading troops in a complex environment with little close supervision-return to the non-deployed Army? Will the Army leverage this newly developed adaptability? Or will bureaucratic forces gradually whittle away and wear down these young warriors with Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), Tactics,

Techniques and Procedures (TTPs), Mission Readiness Evaluations (MREs), and strict adherence to the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP)?”<sup>33</sup>

An article written by T. Owen Jacobs in 1985, detailed leadership characteristics needed to fight the then emerging and now obsolete “Air Land Battle” Doctrine and the predicted uncertainty of the battles of the year 2000 and beyond. Ironically, Jacobs includes the transformational leadership attributes displayed by the Armys JOs during OIF today - flexibility, adaptability, and the capacity and opportunity to experiment with unfamiliar situations (innovation) in his short list of Army leadership requirements.<sup>34</sup> These attributes were codified in the Army’s most recent Leadership development study – Army Leader in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, and are encapsulated in the desired Army Leader 21: The Pentathlete.<sup>35</sup> This Pentathlete concept was assimilated into the updated Army Strategic Leader Competencies. Figure one depicts the attributes of the Pentathlete, the strategic leader, and the transformational leader. In comparing these attributes, it can be concluded that transformational leadership attributes provide the foundation for the development of the Pentathlete and future strategic leader. Therefore, the Army must develop and retain transformational leaders in order to achieve its 21<sup>st</sup> century leadership requirements.

| <b>AL21 The Pentathlete Attributes</b>                         | <b>Army Strategic Leader Meta Competencies<sup>36</sup></b> | <b>Transformational Leader Attributes/Behaviors</b>  |
|--|---|--|
| Decisive with Integrity and character                          | Identity – maturity beyond awareness                        | Admired, respected and trusted role model Demonstrates high standards of Ethical and Moral Conduct |
| Confident and competent decision maker in uncertain situations | Mental Agility  | Confident and Competent, Persistent and Determined   |
| Prudent Risk Taker   | Cross-cultural Savvy  | Willing to take Risks  |
| Innovative   | Interpersonal Maturity                                      | Innovative   |
| Adaptive   | World-class Warrior   | Conceptual and Creative  |
| Empathetic   | Professional Astuteness                                     | Strong interpersonal skills  |
| Effective Communicator   |   | Strong Communicator Effective Listener<br>Two-way communicator                                     |
| Professionally educated  |   | Committed to goals and shared vision   |
| Dedicated to life-long learning                                |   | Inspirational Team builder   |
|  |   | Develops subordinates – coach and mentor   |
|  |   | Empowers Subordinates  |

Figure One – Comparison of Leader Attributes

In summary, the Army has recognized the need to develop transformational leaders to meet its external requirement to fight and win the nations wars, and its internal requirement to retain quality Generation Y leaders. Transformational leaders that intellectually stimulate, develop subordinates, and inspire full commitment to organizational goals and values, while effectively communicating intent through vision, are necessary to successfully lead adaptive and innovative units in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century VUCA security environment. Furthermore, transformational leaders capable of building an organizational culture that promotes deep individual “buy in,” are necessary to keep Army units committed and cohesive despite waning public support for the protracted wars and conflicts that will potentially define 21st century warfare.

### The Symbiotic Relationship of Organizational Culture and Leadership Development

“Organizational culture is the set of institutional, stated, and operating values, beliefs and assumptions that people have about their organization that are validated by experiences over time.”<sup>37</sup> It can be simply defined as the manner in which an organization operates and the way people within it do things. As people enter an organization they learn its culture through behaviors that are taught and reinforced as the “right way” to do things.<sup>38</sup> These cultural values “define the boundaries of acceptable thought and behavior.”<sup>39</sup> “Culture influences how individuals talk to each other, approach problems, anticipate and judge situations, develop expectations, determine right from wrong, establish priorities, and react to many other aspects of organizational and interpersonal behavior.”<sup>40</sup> Therefore, individual success in any mature profession/organization is directly dependent upon individual adherence to cultural values and behavioral norms. In other words, those that rise to leadership positions in these organizations successfully display the cultural survival attributes that “stay within the lines” of the culture. Thus, organizational culture and leadership have a symbiotic relationship: culture dictates leader behavior/development, and leader behavior/development reinforces cultural norms.

Cultural change refers to a “system wide change in an organization that demands new ways of perceiving, thinking and behaving by all its members.”<sup>41</sup> Therefore, the ability of an organization to change its culture is directly dependent upon the leaders within it. “Leaders create and reinforce norms and behaviors within the culture. [Cultural] norms develop because of what leaders stress as important,...and the way they [act as] role models.”<sup>42</sup> Changing the culture of a mature organization requires a cadre of leaders that are willing to take risk by working outside the lines and establishing new cultural paradigms. Without courageous leadership, mature organizations tend to default to the “old commitments, values, traditions, regulations and rites...[that] get in the way of flexible demands on the organization for new

solutions.”<sup>43</sup> Therefore, in order to develop a culture of transformational pentathlete leadership, it is necessary for the Army to identify a cadre of courageous leaders to act as change agents. These change agents must act as role models that promote the attributes of transformational leadership as essential cultural survival attributes. As culture and leadership are inextricably linked, significant changes to leadership philosophy cannot be made without addressing the cultural behavioral norms, survival attributes, and bureaucratic systems that stand as obstacles to change.

## Section II - Army Cultural Challenges to Overcome In the Development of Transformational Leaders

### Challenge one – Obtaining initial Change Agents – the Champions of Change

As discussed previously the symbiotic and enabling relationship between culture and leaders make the senior leaders within the culture the first target for change. They must be the first believers in change and act as change agents to drive the change within the organization. Within the Army's hierarchical organizational structure, the initial change agents must be its senior/strategic leaders as “the essence of strategic leadership is the ability to understand the existing culture and to shape the organizations culture and values to support a vision while retaining the trust and confidence of subordinates.”<sup>44</sup> However, as the initial target for change, this group may perhaps be the toughest to sell due to personality composition. Despite the diversity of the Army's senior leadership as a group, there is an uncanny similarity in personality preference.

Surveys conducted at the USAWC and ICAF over disparate years indicate consistently that approximately 30% of the Army's Senior Leadership has the Myers Briggs Personality Type Indicator (MBTI) of “ISTJ”, with over 70% of those populations possessing the “STJ” indicators.<sup>45</sup> According to studies conducted by Otto Krueger, a leading MBTI analyst, ISTJ is the predominant personality in the military force altogether, and that “while ISTJs themselves comprise only about 6 percent of the general population, they comprise about 30 percent of the US Armed Forces. This similarity between senior leader and general US military population provides evidence of the strong tie between leader behavior and cultural tendencies. The ISTJs four preferences are found overwhelmingly in the military: the combined army, navy, air force and marines is 58 percent Introverted, 72 percent Sensing, 90 percent Thinking, and 80 percent Judging – ISTJ.”<sup>46</sup> The human behavioral tendencies and preferences that provide the foundation of the MBTI assist in explaining why different kinds of people are interested in different things, prefer different kinds of work, and sometimes find it hard to understand each

other – all due to basic differences in how people take in information and make decisions about it.<sup>47</sup> In other words this indicator can be used in a general sense to predict how a group prefers to approach a problem or issue and consequently react to change. Therefore, the primary targets for Army cultural change agents are ISTJ personality types that have grown to succeed within the current Army culture. To understand the challenge ahead, one must understand the ISTJ. Below is an excerpt from the description of the ISTJ:

- “People with ISTJ preferences have a strong sense of responsibility and great loyalty to the organizations, families and relationships in their lives. They work with steady energy to fulfill commitments as stated and on time. They will go to almost any trouble to complete something they see as necessary but balk at doing anything that doesn’t make sense to them.
- ISTJs generally prefer to work alone and be accountable for the results; however, they are comfortable working in teams when it is necessary to do the job right, when roles are clearly defined, and when people fulfill assigned responsibilities. ISTJs have a profound respect for facts. They use their Sensing primarily internally, when they have a storehouse of information upon which they draw to understand the present. Thus, they are likely to be practical, sensible, realistic and systematic.
- ISTJs use Thinking in decision making, taking an objective, logical, and tough-minded approach. Their focus is on the task or system as a whole rather than on individuals. They then try to be logical, analytical, detached, and reasonable.
- ISTJs are clear and steadfast in their opinions because they have arrived at them by applying logical criteria based on their experience and knowledge. They believe standard procedures exist because they work. ISTJs place a tremendous value on traditions and will support change only when facts demonstrate it will bring better results.”<sup>48</sup>

In approaching work on a daily basis, “If anyone invented the chain of command, it would probably be an ISTJ...they establish a structure and work it most effectively, expecting others to do likewise...They live by shoulds, and impose them freely, they get the job done.”<sup>49</sup>

The personality preferences that impact an organizations ability to implement change are those that indicate how one prefers to gather data specifically how one sees the situation, and how one orients behavior.<sup>50</sup> Generally people with the preference the two areas of S (Sensor) and J (Judger), present the greatest challenge to an organization in need of change. The Sensor group gathers data strictly through the five senses, the “just the facts” approach. Therefore, in approaching change a common feeling amongst this group would be “if it ain’t

broke don't fix it, and that fantasy [imagination] is a dirty word."<sup>51</sup> The Judger group displays a highly organized structure in behavior and in thinking. When approaching change, this group, "doesn't like surprises" and "can become unraveled if things don't go exactly as planned."<sup>52</sup> Therefore, the SJ combination can be characterized as generally structured and somewhat unimaginative with an extremely guarded approach to innovation and change. With the majority of its leadership and over 70% of the general population possessing the SJ preference, it is easy to see the significant challenge the Army has in making institutional cultural or leadership changes. As previously stated in the introduction, it appears that COL Hutton understood this cultural obstacle when he stated, "The Army learns very slowly, because you have to change the culture; the culture changes slowly because innovators are forced out. If we're going to do one thing to make the organization healthy, we have to promote people who aren't like us."<sup>53</sup> Internally, this preference is perhaps manifested in the words of a young officer interviewed in Iraq during OIF who stated, "I know the Army hates this word, but the OIF environment keeps me flexible...The Army hates the word because if you have ever been to a training rotation, you always have an AAR, and the thing that they always tell you...is don't ever say under one of your Sustains – flexible. Don't even bother...The Army hates to hear the word flexible."<sup>54</sup> Externally, it can be seen in analyzing the approach the military has taken in implementing the congressionally mandated Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, commonly known as the Goldwater Nichols Act. Leadership and change expert and author Dr. Larry W. Stout noted that "Military officers who have developed their careers in one system are not so quick to want to jump into another. There is an old adage that says if something is not broken, do not attempt to fix it. To many within the military in the United States, this position of strength has worked in America's favor and should be maintained."<sup>55</sup>

Therefore, in its efforts to change the culture to value the transformational/pentathlete attributes of flexibility, agility, innovation, and imagination, the Army will be challenged in getting initial change agents at all levels in the organization. Convincing the STJ leadership to first embrace the need to change and secondly operate and become role models of behaviors that are generally outside of their personality preferences, will potentially be a significant obstacle to changing the culture to develop and embrace transformational leadership.

#### Obstacle Two – The "By the Book" mentality, "By the Numbers" Methodology

To understand why a "by the book" mentality so stifles a culture that encourages innovative and innovation, it is necessary to articulate the full meaning of this term. The current senior and mid-grade leaders of today matured as leaders in an Army where the majority of all

organizational activities are regulated or dictated in some form or fashion: the cultural system control artifacts. These artifacts - doctrine (Field Manuals (FMs), Technical Manuals (TMs), Mission Training Plans (MTPs)), US Army regulations (ARs), TTPs, SOPs, Inspector General (IG) checklists, and command policies, coupled with the myriad of processes they support, tell Army leaders at brigade, battalion, and especially company grade level in a garrison environment exactly what to do. This centralized control of unit activities was quantified in a 2002 study conducted by Dr. Leonard Wong, US Army War College. Alarming, the analysis of all directed requirements on a company revealed a requirement for 297 training days with only 256 days available to accomplish them. The study also showed that company commanders were not only burdened with the “big brother” approach to management of unit activities, they were also overburdened by the myriad of administrative statistics that the company commander and battalion commander were both responsible for maintaining, in order to track compliance with the numerous requirements of the cultural system control artifacts.<sup>56</sup> He concludes in this monograph that in the garrison environment, there is simply not time for innovation and creativity at the company level, when seemingly the genesis of all company activities are mandatory requirements or higher headquarters directives.<sup>57</sup> This hyper controlled, over-regulated, and centralized process oriented garrison environment creates a checklist mentality and limits operational and planning flexibility of leaders at all levels of the US Army. Take for example the lowest level of leadership – the squad leader – who, by regulation, maintains job books or checklists of individual training requirements for all the Soldiers in his/her squad.

In 1988, R.E. Quinn proposed a Competing Values Framework, in which he defines eight primary leadership responsibilities/roles.<sup>58</sup> In this model, see figure two, he divides these roles into 4 quadrants – Task Leadership, Stability Leadership, People Leadership, and Adaptive Leadership. The axis’ that define the quadrants are the flexibility to control and internal to external control continuums. The over-regulated/controlled garrison environment, keeps the Army’s small unit/organizational leaders in the lower two quadrants of the model in which control is high. In the lower right quadrant where control and external influence is high, leaders are relegated to either the Producer or Director Roles. The Producer “seeks closure and motivates those behaviors that will result in the completion of the unit’s task.”<sup>59</sup> The Director “emphasizes setting and clarifying goals and establishes clear expectation.”<sup>60</sup> This quadrant defines a manager with influence to get the externally focused missions accomplished, which perfectly describes the Army’s company level leadership in a garrison environment. The lower left quadrant reflects high control and high internal influences. Leaders in this quadrant are characterized as Monitors or Coordinators. Monitors “collect and distribute information, check



on performance, and provide a sense of continuity and stability.”<sup>61</sup> Leaders in the coordinator role “maintain structure, do the scheduling, coordinating and problem-solving, and see that rules and standards are met.”<sup>62</sup> Ironically, this is the quadrant, which doctrinally battalion and brigade commanders operate on a daily basis in garrison. Therefore, as a result of the “by the book” centralized and over-regulated process driven daily operational culture, the Army’s leadership in garrison operates primarily in the highly controlled environment with little flexibility to develop the transformational skills of Adaptive - Innovator and Broker, and People – Mentor and Facilitator) leadership.




Figure 2 – R.E. Quinn’s Competing Values Framework.<sup>63</sup>

Compounding the over-regulation and control is the fact that the cultural system control artifacts are not only directive in nature; the majority of them are also prescriptive. Therefore, they not only tell leaders what to do, they, in most cases, tell them how to do it. This prescriptive approach is labeled the “by the numbers” culture.<sup>64</sup> The SOPs, TTPs, MTPs, as well as some ARs and policies, are checklists. Checklists that are so detailed that thinking through the referenced issue or process is not necessary – they are written to be what is commonly known as idiot or “snuffy” proof.<sup>65</sup> The MDMP – the cornerstone of Army instruction in the approach to problem solving, perpetuates this deliberate, lock-step, by the numbers mentality. The Army’s 2001 *Objective Force White Paper* detailed the necessity for future leaders to “change from plan-centric to intent-centric operations,” to adapt and modify plans at the lowest level to best facilitate defeat of the enemy based on a thorough understanding of commander’s intent.<sup>66</sup> GEN Schoomaker reinforced this imperative to minimize dependence on deliberate planning when he stated “Can you find the opportunity within the chaos? Because you can’t organize the chaos of the battlefield.”<sup>67</sup> Despite efforts to replace the laborious plan

centric MDMP with the commanders intent situation based Recognition-Primed Decision Making Model, the doctrinal legacy: the MDMP (an artifact of the by the numbers culture) still remains the basis for planning instruction in Army training institutions.<sup>68</sup>

The unfortunate consequence of the by the book, by the numbers culture is an organizational climate that defines success in terms of measurable short-term performance. The cultural system control artifacts (ARs, FMs, TMs, TTPs, SOPs, IG checklists, MTPs) that contain the what to and how to standards and requirements, are also time dependent - most on an annual basis. This annual checklist of requirements, as illustrated by Wong above, leaves little, if any, time for experimentation, flexibility, and initiative, which creates a propensity towards the reactive Management by Exception (MBE) transactional leadership style.<sup>69</sup>

There are two types of MBE styles – Active and Passive. “In active MBE, the leader arranges to actively monitor deviances from standards, mistakes, and errors...and takes corrective action as necessary. In the less desirable passive MBE style, the leader waits passively for deviances, mistakes and errors to occur and then takes corrective action.”<sup>70</sup> In both instances, the focus on achieving checklist requirements often forces leaders into the, “if it ain’t broke don’t fix it” mode that directly contradicts the transformational leadership concept of inspiring continuous improvement through intellectual stimulation. Therefore, leaders in pursuit of completing all the artifactual control checklist requirements, particularly in today’s high OPTEMPO environment, typically promulgate a command climate that is risk adverse, stifling, stagnant, mundane, numbers-based, micro-managed, and short-term focused, as they react to checklist requirements. An essay titled, “Leadership competencies required for the New Army” perfectly summarizes the effect of the by the numbers culture as it states: “The trend toward empowerment and greater reliance on initiative and problem solving in response to specific crisis seems inconsistent with the strong proclivity of the military to develop standard operating procedures for all types of activities and situations. Doctrine is a beneficial way to incorporate learning and strengthen institutional memory, but when overdone it can stifle creativity needed for more individual initiative in dealing with unique, unforeseen problems.”<sup>71</sup>

### Obstacle Three – The “Survival Attributes” the Officer Evaluation System

The ability of the Officer Evaluation System to act as an evaluative and developmental tool for transformational leadership is limited because it cannot accurately assess the attributes of transformational leadership. Leadership ability is measured primarily by unit achievements; specifically in the accomplishment of short-term annual objectives that are often based on the cultural system control artifacts: passing inspections, training evaluations, etc. Although the

senior rater portion of the officer efficiency report (OER) is designed to focus on leadership potential, the Army does not have an institutionalized formal leadership assessment program to assist senior leaders in this evaluation.<sup>72</sup> Therefore, a senior rater with limited exposure to the rated officer tends to evaluate leadership potential on the achievement of annual accomplishments- short-term performance. This tendency appears to be reinforced by the findings of a personality study regarding the attitude of Army senior leaders. This study indicated that Army Senior Leaders show “greater comfort with data [measurable achievement] than with intuition, and a high achievement through conformity orientation.”<sup>73</sup> Consequently, it can be surmised that the leadership potential assessment is more an evaluation of the rated officer’s ability to manage: leading a team to successfully maintain the operational systems and process (by the book, by the numbers), vice his/her ability to lead. “Management is maintaining the organization, keeping everything running smoothly; whereas leaders push to make changes- they go beyond status quo.”<sup>74</sup> Further, it can be concluded that without the aid of additional measurable data regarding the transformational leadership abilities of its officers, the evaluation of Army leadership potential appears to be based more on the ability to follow (directives and cultural system control artifacts) than to lead.

Because culture is “influenced by what is paid attention to, measured, and controlled, this short-term results oriented evaluation system reinforces the MBE transactional style of leadership.”<sup>75</sup> This not only further strengthens the by the book, by the numbers culture, and a checklist driven mentality, it also promotes attributes associated with short term results focused management as cultural “survival attributes.”<sup>76</sup> Visionary/long term transformational leadership attributes cannot, at present, be accurately measured, and therefore are not valued. A 2-year 360-degree analysis of the leadership attributes of officers attending the USAWC and ICAF (the top 5% of Army leadership) showed that both the officers themselves, and their superiors – the Army’s most senior leaders, generally did not value high scores in creativity or complexity indicators of the officers.<sup>77</sup> In other words these transformational strategic leadership skills did not possess any “survival value” – they were not seen as important in gaining and maintaining a competitive edge.<sup>78</sup> Ulmer summarized the limitations of the current Officer Evaluation System as an obstacle to evaluation and development of transformational leadership in an article written for Parameters in 1998:

Transformational leaders have been identified in both military and commercial settings as more effective than are leaders who rely heavily on transactional or management-by-exception leadership styles...Some of the critical characteristics and behaviors of the transformational leader are often undisclosed to the boss but are glaringly evident to subordinates and frequently clear to peers. What the boss measures most reliably are immediate task accomplishment, structural

decisions, and adherence to prescribed strategy. Perhaps this is why the Army has probably produced the most effective cadre of managers of short-term results--in addition to large numbers of true leaders--on the planet. Meanwhile, transformational behaviors, such as articulating a motivational vision, providing intellectual challenge, inspiring teamwork, considering subordinates as individuals, being open to ideas, demonstrating moral courage, and setting the example of subordinating self to mission, are unreliably observed by seniors even though they require just that information for their evaluation of subordinates.<sup>79</sup>

#### Obstacle Four – The Linear Assignment Progression.

All three obstacles articulated above: The “STJ” personality preference, the by the book, by the numbers bureaucratic systems that reinforce the STJ preferences, and the evaluation system that rewards adherence to bureaucratic norms, are contained within a hierarchical organizational structure that results in a production line style experiential leader development program. This cookie cutter relatively closed production line contributes to organizational inflexibility that consciously and unconsciously stifles innovation and the promotion of transformational leadership attributes.

The linear, cookie cutter, assignment progression was highlighted in the 2006 Army Leader 21, Review of Education, Training, Assignments and Leader Development (RETAL) study. This study was initiated by the 19th Secretary of the Army, Francis J. Harvey, in order to explore methods to ensure development of the pentathlete. This study included the examination of the career paths of the 15 Colonels selected in 2006 for Tactical Brigade Combat Team (BCT) command. The results indicated that the Army has “a culture in which officers aspire to the highest positions of responsibility...[through] narrow career paths.”<sup>80</sup> Because leaders, in a hierarchical organization gain confidence through a linear experiential build, they typically operate under what Bradford and Cohen have termed the “myth of heroic management.”<sup>81</sup> This theory states that in order to feel competent, leaders must live up to the following myths:

- A good leader knows at all times what is going on in the organization.
- A good leader should have more technical expertise than any subordinate.
- A good leader should be able to solve any problem that comes up.
- A good leader should be the primary person responsible for how the organization is working.<sup>82</sup>

This myth is not based on “inflated egos.”<sup>83</sup> Instead, leaders “learn to expect these things of themselves, from other [leaders] and from other role models, such as great leaders in history. To [compound] the problem, other people including both their superiors and subordinates

expect them to be heroic as well. To be otherwise in [American] culture would be to abdicate the position, or invite a poor performance appraisal.”<sup>84</sup> Social scientist Victor Vroom’s, “Expectancy Theory,” suggests that subordinates will modify their behaviors and thoughts in order to conform to what they perceive the boss will approve, which results in the unconscious stifling of new ideas and ultimately creative innovation.<sup>85</sup> Together these two theories within the Army’s linear progression assignment structure result in the following potential scenario. A subordinate company commander knows that his BCT Commander has “been there, done that,” therefore, he expects the BCT Commander to know the solution to the problem. Therefore, instead of risking disapproval with an outside the lines/box solution, the company commander subconsciously restricts/edits his thinking to conform to what he thinks his boss, the BCT Commander will approve. The result of this scenario is that the BCT Commander by default becomes the primary determinate for the flexibility and innovativeness of a unit.

Some may argue that the linear, hierarchical structure provides the Army with the most effective way to produce tactically and technically competent leaders for its combat formations. In fact, the AL21 study cites the initial tactical and operational successes in OIF/OEF, and the responsiveness and relevance of training throughout the Army’s training centers, as evidence that officer training, assignment and leader development for the kinetic fight are fundamentally sound.”<sup>86</sup> However, in examining the Army as a profession and a learning organization, as linearly developed leaders “rise in the hierarchy and accumulate more and more power, they take their thinking patterns with them. Then, both consciously and unconsciously...use their power to shape what others think and believe.”<sup>87</sup> In revisiting Einstein’s insight that the “problems of today cannot be solved using the same thinking as when they were created” perhaps a homogenous force of leaders that possess “been there, done that” knowledge stifles infusion of new ideas in addressing the uncertainty and ambiguity of today’s security environment.<sup>88</sup>

### Section III - Recommendations

#### Addressing the By the Book Culture

According to Watkins and Snider, published experts in the study of Army Culture: “The Army’s bureaucratic nature outweighs and compromises its professional nature. This is true in practice, but of greater importance it is regarded as true in the minds of the officer corps. Officers...accept the pervasiveness of bureaucratic norms and behaviors as natural and appropriate.”<sup>89</sup> This cultural mindset created by the Army’s bureaucracy: its by the book culture, significantly hampers its ability to develop transformational leaders/pentathletes necessary to

posture the profession for success in the 21<sup>st</sup> century VUCA security environment. In order to mitigate the effects of the by the book culture the Army should consider minimizing the book by conducting a thorough review of all cultural system control artifacts (doctrine, ARs, and policies) to identify redundant, competing, and unnecessary bureaucratic requirements. As a point of reference, the US Army has only seven Army cultural Values, yet it has 669 Army Regulations, therefore, implementing this recommendation will take a significant dedication of time and resources. In this review, the Army should consider replacing the how to checklists with conceptually based requirements that empower leaders to independently develop action plans to achieve the desired end-state. The recommended goal of this review is to eliminate the one size fits all mandatory checklist approach. Similar to the soon to be implemented modifications to the methodology of the common-task training system, leaders at all levels must be empowered to select individual training tasks applicable to their unit for their mission, development of subordinate leaders, and long-term growth of the unit/organization. The Army can no longer afford to subordinate the responsibilities of thinking leadership to bureaucratic policies and requirements.

#### Addressing the By the Numbers Culture

Mitigating the effects of the how to-by the numbers culture, is unfortunately a much more difficult and resource intensive task. In order to eliminate this culture it is necessary for the US Army to move from an institution that operates primarily in the “Knowledge and Comprehension” levels of thinking, to one that can operate at the “Application and Analysis” levels as a professional norm. Likewise leader development should focus on the “Synthesis and Evaluation” levels of Blooms Taxonomy.<sup>90</sup> In other words, the Army must evolve from a profession that: lists, shows, recalls, defines, describes, demonstrates, paraphrases, compares, and summarizes, to one that: applies, explains, interprets, solves, discovers, deduces, infers, and analyzes in its operational mode and leadership style.<sup>91</sup> Likewise, leader development must be further characterized by the highest levels of thinking associated with the verbs: formulate, combine, substitute, design, invent, measure, convince, judge, evaluate, justify, and hypothesize.<sup>92</sup> In order to move in this direction, the Army should initially focus on modifying institutional training methodology.

It is the 21st century yet the Army is still utilizing 19th century training methodologies. It is a travesty to step into today’s Advanced Individual Training classroom to observe students filling in the blanks in a workbook with words highlighted on power point charts shown by an instructor reading the slides and stopping his foot to emphasize what the students need to write in the

workbook. For Generation Y, a generation raised in multi-media, this type of instruction is insulting, boring, and unchallenging. Opponents of teaching initial entry training at higher levels of thinking argue that the Army must train the basics at the “knowledge” level (list, name, identify, define, recall) prior to moving onto higher levels of thinking at unit level. However, educators are taught that “Students just embarking in a new discipline ought to be encouraged to practice the full array of higher-order thinking skills even while their subject-matter knowledge is fairly limited.”<sup>93</sup> Therefore, if school children can operate successfully at higher levels of thinking, Soldiers of the worlds premier land force can as well.

Equally tragic, is the fact that the lecture instructional method is still being utilized in the Basic Officer Leadership Course (BOLC) and Captains Career Courses (CCC). Although BOLC Phase II focuses on group learning in a tactical environment, the technical phase – BOLC Phase III, of instruction is governed by individual TRADOC proponent schools. Unfortunately, although TRADOC promotes scenario based, application/experiential based learning methods, its proponent schools are only resourced to provide minimal analytical learning in the institutional environment (BOLC III or CCC). Instructor contact hours, the foundation of the current resourcing system, are tailored to support the by the numbers non-experiential lecture instructional format. To evolve to the Application and Analysis level of education, systems govern training resource modeling, training development, instructor training and certification, and testing and evaluation require significant reform. The cornerstone of institutional training must be to develop the “frame of reference that produces understanding of the dynamics of the rule system, how to modify or adjust the system to meet situational challenge, and how to operate within the system to produce previously untried solutions to situational challenge. The frame of reference must be accompanied by a mind-set capable of constantly reexamining the logic of current alternatives and their current formulations of the real situation.”<sup>94</sup>

The challenge [in educating leaders] is to implant methods for raising awareness about the cognitive and emotional processes that result in decisions. The core of the “learning” issue may be illustrated by a battalion commander's learning from a training incident where the advancing forces moved beyond the range of supporting mortars. One lesson might be, “I learned to displace the mortars more frequently so they can provide continuous coverage to the advancing troops.” A deeper learning might be, “I learned that I need to change my behavior and approach to the staff so that they can interrupt me if necessary to get timely approval to displace the mortars. Or, perhaps I should delegate that authority to my operations officer or fire support officer.”<sup>95</sup>

If the US Army trains and educates at this frame of reference analysis level, and makes daily operations at that level a cultural norm, it will begin to lay the foundation and create a fertile environment for the growth and development of transformational leaders.

Addressing the Officer Evaluation System/Officer Efficiency Report (OER).

As the by the book, by the numbers culture changes, so too must its complementary performance based evaluation system. The OER should evolve from a core competency based performance evaluation, to one that also assesses and develops transformational leadership. Although evaluation of the core competencies of the warfighting profession must remain a fundamental priority, they, without a formalized 360-degree evaluation of leadership abilities, are limited in their ability to identify and develop transformational leaders. The assumption that an officer's leadership ability directly correlate to unit accomplishments must be replaced with a system that fully assesses, evaluates, and documents leadership ability throughout a career.

Therefore, the officer evaluation system should include a formalized 360-degree leadership assessment. There are numerous tools available in corporate America to choose from. Transformational leadership assessment tools such as Maxwell's 360-degree assessment of leadership, and the Multifactor Leadership questionnaire MLQ could aid senior raters in gaining an accurate assessment of actual leadership abilities and provide a basis for individualized leadership development plans.<sup>96</sup> The tool selected should be completed annually per the current officer evaluation system. Additionally, and more importantly, its results should be placed in a database to form a career-long term leader development assessment portfolio. Ultimately, this system should provide leaders a tool to increase the self-awareness necessary for leadership growth, while allowing the Army to select its highest quality transformational leaders. Ulmer summarizes the scope of this issue:

If in fact leadership is important, we need to develop more effective ways to measure it than we now possess. We have found no way to verify the presence or absence of some crucial leader behaviors other than to query the followers. If the institution cannot come to grips with this fact, it will never reduce significantly the error rate in leader selection. The need to enhance the retention of high-quality personnel in the competitive decades ahead will reduce even further the acceptable level of mistakes in military leader selection.<sup>97</sup>

Addressing the Linear Assignment Progression System

Frankly, the Army cannot afford to abandon its hierarchical linear assignment progression system because of the necessity for experienced leaders in its combat formations. However, widening the career path experience as recommended by the AL 21 study coupled with decreasing the process oriented by the book, by the numbers culture, can mitigate this obstacle. The disadvantages created by the linear progression of leaders will be minimal as the culture changes to promote leaders that model "transformational behaviors, such as articulating a motivational vision, providing intellectual challenge, inspiring teamwork, considering



subordinates as individuals, being open to ideas, demonstrating moral courage, and setting the example of subordinating self to mission.”<sup>98</sup>

## Conclusion

“No leader development system can succeed unless all elements of the system are focused on the same set of objectives and that set of objectives is consistent with operating values and the organizations culture.”<sup>99</sup> In order to meet the Army’s recognized need for transformational/pentathlete leaders to meet the requirements of the 21<sup>st</sup> century security environment, it must begin a deliberate process to change its culture. In approaching this exploration of cultural change, the US Army must heed General McArthur’s challenge to “think forward,” and use Albert Einstein’s planning imperative that “the significant problems we face today cannot be solved at the same level of thinking we were at when we created them.”<sup>100</sup> The Army’s by the book, by the numbers process driven garrison and training culture is the “root cause” behind its inability to develop a transformational culture that values imagination and innovation, adaptation and agility, and intellectual and individual stimulation.<sup>101</sup> This hyper controlled culture coupled with an extremely high OPTEMPO, forces leaders to default to the MBE “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” transactional style of leadership as they try to accomplish all these scripted requirements without the appropriate time in which to get them done. The decentralized battlefields of OIF provide the environment for development of transformational leadership skills; it is time for the Army to recommit to its long-time mantra to “train like it fights.” It is time for the Army to address the bureaucratic by the numbers by the book, by the numbers “process over product” oriented garrison and training environments.<sup>102</sup> In order to create a culture of innovation that develops and promotes transformational leaders. The “culture of process” must be replaced with a “culture of innovation.”<sup>103</sup> Once the Army establishes a culture of innovation that establishes transformational leadership behaviors as its survival attributes, it will be in position in meet the challenge issued in 2001 by President George W. Bush in establishing a military culture that rewards “new thinking, innovation, and experimentation.”<sup>104</sup> Only then can the Army establish a leader development program that is able to produce the pentathlete leader.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> GEN Dennis J. Reimer “AFTER WORD: LEADERSHIP”, James G. Hunt, George E. Dodge, Leonard Wong eds, *Out-of-the-box Leadership: Transforming the Twenty-First-Century Army and Other Top-Performing Organizations* (Stamford, CT, JAI Press 1999) 292.

<sup>2</sup> GEN Dennis J. Reimer documented the need for development of agile and adaptive leaders in an article titled "AFTER WORD: LEADERSHIP", James G. Hunt, George E. Dodge, Leonard Wong eds, *Out-of-the-box Leadership: Transforming the Twenty-First-Century Army and Other Top-Performing Organizations* (Stamford, CT, JAI Press 1999) 292.

<sup>3</sup> Michael L. McGee, T. Own Jacobs, Robert N. Kilcullan and Herbert F. Barber, "Conceptual Capability as Competitive Advantage: Developing Leaders for the New Army", James G. Hunt, George E. Dodge, Leonard Wong eds, *Out-of-the-box Leadership: Transforming the Twenty-First-Century Army and Other Top-Performing Organizations* (Stamford, CT, JAI Press 1999) 235.

<sup>4</sup> John A. Nagl Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife* (Westport, CT, Praeger 2002) 222.

<sup>5</sup> Adapted from an address to the USAWC, 16 August 2006.

<sup>6</sup> Nagl, 221.

<sup>7</sup> US. Department of the Army, *Army Leadership*, Field Manual 22-100 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, August 1999), 3-17.

<sup>8</sup> Farlex, The Free Dictionary, available from <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/influence>, accessed 8 January 2007.

<sup>9</sup> Bernard M. Bass and Ronald E. Riggio, *Transformational Leadership* Second Edition, (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2006), 3-5.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid, 5.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid, 5.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, 4-5.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid, 5.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, 6

<sup>17</sup> GEN Peter J. Schoomaker, quoted in COL Stephen A. Shambach ed, *Strategic Leadership Primer* 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition (Carlisle, PA, US Army War College, Department of Command, Leadership and Management, 2004), 54.

<sup>18</sup> Stephen R. Covey, *"The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People"*, (New York, NY: Fireside, 1989), 42.

<sup>19</sup> Bass and Riggio, 4.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid, 5.

<sup>21</sup> Adapted from US Army Recruiting Web Site, available from <http://www.goarmy.com/strong/index.jsp>, accessed 8 Feb 2007.

<sup>22</sup> Bass and Riggio, 53.

<sup>23</sup> Francis J. Harvey and GEN Peter J. Schoomaker, "A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army 2007" (Washington, DC, February 14, 2007) B-5.

<sup>24</sup> Stambach, 54.

<sup>25</sup> Author not stated, "Generation Y: The Millennials, Ready or not, here they come", available from <http://www.nasrecruitment.com/TalentTips/NASinsights/GenerationY.pdf>, accessed 4 Feb 07.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Stephanie Armour, "Generation Y: They've arrived at work with a new attitude", *USA Today*, November 8, 2005, available from [http://www.usatoday.com/money/workplace/2005-11-06-gen-y\\_x.htm](http://www.usatoday.com/money/workplace/2005-11-06-gen-y_x.htm), 8 Nov 2006.

<sup>29</sup> Thom Shanker, "Young Officers Leaving Army at a High Rate", *New York Times*, April 10, 2006, available from <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/10/washington/10army.html?ei=5088&en=cc81835224264ae3&ex=1302321600&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss&pagewanted=print>, accessed 22 Feb 07.

<sup>30</sup> Charles A. Henning, CRS Report for Congress "Army Officer Shortages: Background and Issues for Congress" (5 July 2005), available from [www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33518.pdf](http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33518.pdf), accessed 22 Feb 07.

<sup>31</sup> Leonard Wong, *Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom*. (Carlisle Pa: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, July 2004) 2-3.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid, 2.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid, 17.

<sup>34</sup> T. Owen Jacobs, "The Airland Battle Leadership Requirements", James G. Hunt and John D. Blair eds *Leadership on the Future Battlefield* (Washington DC, Pergamon-Brassey's 1985) 29.

<sup>35</sup> Adapted from a RETAL overview briefing given by MG Huntoon to USAWC Noon Time Lecture date xx.

<sup>36</sup> Stambach, 31.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid, 21.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid, 21.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid, 21.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid, 33.

<sup>41</sup> Killman, R. H., Covin, T. J. & associates Corporate Transformation (San Francisco CA, Jossey-Bass) referenced in R. Hooijberg, R. Craig Bullis and James G. Hunt “Behavioral Complexity and the Development of Military Leadership for the Twenty-First Century” James G. Hunt, George E. Dodge, Leonard Wong eds, *Out-of-the-box Leadership: Transforming the Twenty-First-Century Army and Other Top-Performing Organizations* (Stamford, CT, JAI Press 1999) 128.

<sup>42</sup> Bass and Riggio, 63, bracketed words ([cultural] and [act as]) are inserted into original quotation for clarity.

<sup>43</sup> Bass and Riggio, 63, bracket word ([that]) is inserted into original quotation for clarity.

<sup>44</sup> Stambach, 37.

<sup>45</sup> M.L. McGee, T.O. Jacobs, R.N. Killcullan, and H.F. Barber, “Developing Leaders for the New Army” in James G. Hunt, George E. Dodge, Leonard Wong eds, *Out-of-the-box Leadership: Transforming the Twenty-First-Century Army and Other Top-Performing Organizations* (Stamford, CT, JAI Press 1999) 227-237.

<sup>46</sup> Otto Krueger and Janet M. Thuesen, *Type Talk at Work: How the personality types determine your success on the job* (New York, NY: Dell Publishing, 1992), 303 – 304.

<sup>47</sup> CPP, Inc., interpreted by COL Thomas J. Williams, PhD Myers-Briggs Type Indicator Interpretive Report/ISTJ, (1 August 2006) 3.

<sup>48</sup> Adapted from Otto Kruegers briefing to US Army War College, 18 August 2006.

<sup>49</sup> Krueger and Thuesen, 304.

<sup>50</sup> Krueger and Thuesen, 19-20.

<sup>51</sup> Krueger and Thuesen, 19, bracketed word [imagination] is provided for clarity.

<sup>52</sup> Krueger and Thuesen, 23.

<sup>53</sup> Nagl, 222.

<sup>54</sup> Wong, 1-22, 16.

<sup>55</sup> Larry Stout, PhD., *Time for A Change, Ideal Leadership Series*, (Shippensburg, PA, Destiny Image, 2006) 97.

<sup>56</sup> “Big Brother” is a common-term adopted from George Orwell’s *1984* – “big brother” refers to intrusive state oversight into the lives of private citizens.

<sup>57</sup> Leonard Wong, “Stifling Innovation: Developing Tomorrow’s Leaders Today.” (Carlisle, PA, US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, April 2002) 6-34.

<sup>58</sup> Hooijberg, R. Craig Bullis and James G. Hunt, 120.

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<sup>60</sup> Ibid, 120-121.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

<sup>64</sup> “By the numbers” is a term coined by the author to articulate the checklist driven, process oriented operational culture.

<sup>65</sup> “Snuffy” is a common term used in the U.S. Army to describe the average lower enlisted Soldier or Private.

<sup>66</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. Army White Paper, Concepts for the Objective Force. Available from <http://www.army.mil/features/WhitePaper/ObjectiveForceWhitePaper.pdf>, 2001, pg 5. Referenced in Wong Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 1.

<sup>67</sup> Quoted in Thom Shanker, “New Chief Sets Out to Redesign a Stretched-Thin Army,” *The New York Times*, January 28, 2004, p. A 19.

<sup>68</sup> The recognition based decision-making process is an abbreviated MDMP process in which the commander states intent and provides a directed course of action for the staff to develop. It facilitates rapid planning and adaptation to events on the ground. Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Bass and Riggio, 7.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

<sup>71</sup> Gary Yukl, “Leadership Competencies Required for the New Army” in James G. Hunt, George E. Dodge, Leonard Wong eds, *Out-of-the-box Leadership: Transforming the Twenty-First-Century Army and Other Top-Performing Organizations* (Stamford, CT, JAI Press 1999) 274.

<sup>72</sup> Leadership assessment tools such as Maxwells, 360-degree assessment of leadership, or the Multifactor Leadership questionnaire MLQ could aid senior raters in gaining an accurate assessment of actual leadership abilities of subordinates.

<sup>73</sup> Walter F. Ulmer Jr., “Military Leadership into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Another bridge too far?” *Parameters*, Spring 1998, 4-25. Available from <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/98spring/ulmer.htm> 22 Jan 07, bracketed words [measurable achievement] is inserted for clarity.

<sup>74</sup> Stout, 39.

<sup>75</sup> Stambach, 36.

<sup>76</sup> M.L. McGee, T.O. Jacobs, R.N. Killcullan, and H.F. Barber, 236.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> Ulmer 4-25.

<sup>80</sup> Adapted from a RETAL overview briefing given by MG Huntoon to USAWC Noon Time Lecture, bracketed word [through] is inserted into original text for clarity purposes.

<sup>81</sup> William A. Passmore, *Creating Strategic Change: Designing the Flexible High-Performing Organization*, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1994) 145.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid, bracketed words [leaders], [compound], and [American] are inserted into original text for clarity.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid, 136.

<sup>86</sup> Adapted from a RETAL overview briefing given by MG Huntoon to USAWC Noon Time Lecture date xx.

<sup>87</sup> Passmore, 137.

<sup>88</sup> Covey, 42.

<sup>89</sup> Gayle L. Watkins and Don M. Snider, "Project Conclusions," in Don M. Snider, Gayle L. Watkins, and Lloyd J. Matthews, eds., *The Future of the Army Profession*, 2002, p. 537.

<sup>90</sup> Knowledge and Comprehension represent the two lowest forms of thinking on Blooms Taxonomy of learning, Application and Analysis are the mid levels, and Synthesis and Evaluation represent the highest levels of cognitive learning. Bloom, B.S. (ed) *Taxonomy of educational objectives, Vol 1: The Cognitive Domain* (New York: McKay) available from <http://www.umnc.edu/ugp/ewp/bloomtax.html>, accessed 15 Oct 2006

<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid.

<sup>95</sup> Ulmer, 4-25, bracketed words are inserted for clarity.

<sup>96</sup> John C. Maxwell, *The 360 Degree Leader: Developing your influence from anywhere in the organization*, (Nashville, TN, Thomas Nelson Inc, 2005) 262-308, and Bass and Riggio, 20-21.

<sup>97</sup> Ulmer, 4-25

<sup>98</sup> Ibid.

<sup>99</sup> McGree, Jacobs, Kilcullan and Barber, 235.

<sup>100</sup> Covey, 42.

<sup>101</sup> "Root Cause" is a term used by the inspector general in determining the primary cause of any issue.

<sup>102</sup> BG David A. Fastabend and Mr. Robert H. Simpson, "Adapt or Die: The Imperative for a Culture of Innovation in the United States Army," *Army Magazine*, February 2004, 20.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid.

